Extradition in China: No Western Treaty, Operation Fox Hunt, and How to Protect Yourself

China’s primary domestic extradition legislation is the Extradition Law of the People’s Republic of China, enacted in 2000. China has concluded bilateral extradition treaties with approximately 60 countries — primarily in Africa, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia — but has no extradition treaty with the US, UK, Canada, Australia, or any EU member state. The Supreme People’s Court reviews and approves the legal aspects of extradition cases; the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinate the diplomatic dimension. The State Council makes the final executive decision on incoming requests.

China’s Extradition Law contains several provisions that limit outgoing extradition from China: the dual criminality requirement, a minimum sentence threshold, and grounds for refusal where the offence is political, military, or where extradition would be contrary to China’s sovereignty or national interests. In practice, China rarely surrenders individuals to Western states. China is not on the US no-extradition list in the formal sense — rather, the absence of a treaty means Western extradition requests to China are simply not processed through treaty channels.

For the person living outside China who is subject to Chinese pursuit, the key risks are different. The absence of a treaty between China and the country where the person is located does not prevent China from seeking informal cooperation or from using INTERPOL mechanisms. China is an active INTERPOL member state, and Chinese-requested Red Notices circulate globally through INTERPOL’s systems.

Operation Fox Hunt (天网, Tiān Wǎng in its early incarnation) and Operation Sky Net are official Chinese government campaigns targeting individuals accused of corruption, economic crime, or money laundering who have fled to foreign countries, primarily the United States, Canada, Australia, and the UK. These operations involve Chinese law enforcement agents operating in foreign jurisdictions — sometimes covertly — to pressure individuals to return voluntarily to China.

The tactics documented in multiple US federal indictments against Chinese agents include: sending family members in China to pressure the individual abroad; visiting the individual in their home country without authorisation from the host state; using community organisations and business networks to create pressure; and in some cases, staging situations designed to coerce return. These activities constitute violations of the sovereignty of the host states and have resulted in the prosecution of Chinese intelligence officers in the United States.

For individuals who believe they may be targeted by Fox Hunt or Sky Net operations, legal protection runs on two tracks: domestic law enforcement in the country of residence (reporting unauthorised Chinese government contact); and the INTERPOL track — challenging any associated Red Notice or other notice type through the CCF to remove the formal international alert that often accompanies these operations.

Hong Kong operates a separate extradition framework under the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 503). Crucially, since 2020 the UK, US, Canada, Australia, and multiple EU states have suspended their bilateral extradition arrangements with Hong Kong in response to the National Security Law. This means Western states will not extradite individuals to Hong Kong under existing suspended agreements. Hong Kong’s own extradition capacity for requesting surrender of individuals in Western states has correspondingly diminished.

The practical implication: transit through Hong Kong International Airport for individuals subject to mainland Chinese proceedings or Hong Kong National Security Law proceedings carries elevated risk — Hong Kong border authorities operate independently of the suspended treaty arrangements and may act on local warrants or mainland Chinese requests through administrative rather than treaty mechanisms.

Our team handles two categories of China-related cases. The first involves Chinese-requested INTERPOL notices — primarily Red Notices — issued in connection with corruption, financial crime, or national security charges. We challenge these at the CCF on grounds including political motivation, failure of dual criminality, and non-compliance with INTERPOL’s data quality standards. China’s domestic designation of corruption offences often encompasses conduct that would not constitute a crime in many INTERPOL member states, providing grounds for a dual criminality challenge at the CCF level.

The second category involves individuals in Western countries who face direct pressure from Chinese government-linked actors — the Fox Hunt pattern. We advise on reporting obligations, documentation of contacts, and protection measures available under the law of the country of residence. We also advise on residency and asylum options where the threat of return to China represents a genuine protection risk. An international arrest warrant issued by Chinese authorities and circulated through INTERPOL channels can be challenged separately from any direct contact campaign.

Facing Chinese pursuit — whether a Red Notice, a Fox Hunt contact, or an extradition request in your country of residence? Contact our team for a confidential consultation.